Introduction
The choice of exchange rate regime and its impact on economic performance is among the most controversial issues in macroeconomic policy. The empirical works on the growth eect of exchange rate volatility conclude either on exchange rate neutrality, or on a dierent eect in industrial and developing 1 Some recent studies suggest that the failure of the empirical literature at bringing a stable, clear-cut eect of exchange volatility to the fore may be due to nonlinear eects: Razin and Rubinstein (2006) allow the exchange rate regime to have both a direct eect on short-term growth, and an indirect one that is channeled through the crisis probability, while Aghion et al. (2009) argue that the choice of exchange rate regime should depend on nancial development. Using a sample of 83 countries spanning the years 1960-2000, they show that real exchange rate volatility can have a signicant impact on the long-term rate of productivity growth, but the eect depends critically on the countries' level of nancial development.
This paper focuses on liability dollarization, which is a feature of nancial underdevelopment that is particularly prominent in emerging markets, and
shows that it can explain the contrasting eects of exchange rate exibility on growth in developing and industrial countries. Liability dollarization, that is, the limited ability of developing countries to borrow in their own currency, is also referred to as original sin . The focus on dollarization is justied by the idea that, on the one hand, the volatility of cash ows matters for long-run growth, as empirical works tend to show (Aghion et al., 2005 (Aghion et al., , 2007 ; on the other, liability dollarization impairs rms' capacities to hedge currency risk.
This idea is tackled both theoretically and empirically.
On the theoretical side, I borrow from Aghion et al. (2009) to build a stylized model in which volatility matters for long-run growth: when rms face credit constraints, negative shocks to their cash ows deteriorate their innovating capacities, whereas a positive shock will not have any impact if the rm is already at its optimum. This asymmetric eect of shocks under nancial frictions rationalizes the negative impact of cash-ow volatility on innovation and growth: the consequences of negative cash ow shocks are not oset by the eects of positive shocks. Besides, wages are sticky, which makes exchange rate policy matter for cash ow volatility. I supplement this framework with two important features to account for the role of nancial dollarization under dierent exchange rate regimes: 1) the production is split into tradable and nontradable goods while rms face costs in tradable goods when innovating; 2) the rms' debt can be partially or completely denominated in terms of tradable goods. The question then is: depending on the level of dollarization, what regime stabilizes better the cash ows -that is, prots net of debt repayments-in terms of tradable goods, thus allowing a better average nancing capacity?
The relative stabilizing properties of exchange rate regimes is a recurring question in the theoretical literature. In particular, whether liability dollarization reverses the superiority of the exible regime in the presence of foreign 1 Baxter and Stockman (1989) were the rst to bring this "instability puzzle" forward.
The literature has since been inconclusive on the subject: Husain et al. (2005) nd that exchange rate exibility is growth-enhancing in industrial countries and neutral in developing economies, while Dubas et al. (2005) , relying on an alternative exchange-rate classication, nd that a xed exchange rate has good growth performances in the latter while it is neutral in the former. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) nd that, on average, countries with a xed exchange rate regime grow at a slower rate. See Tavlas et al. (2008) for a recent survey on this literature.
2 shocks has been a particularly compelling issue.
23 Cespedes et al. (2002) and Devereux et al. (2006) argue that, when using a full-edged DSGE model, the conventional ranking is unchanged. However, Cook and Cook (2002) and Cook (2004) nd, with dierent specications, that the picture is more nuanced. Here,
I develop a stylized model with one feature that is essential in evaluating the dierent performance of regimes, namely the frictions in adjusting consumption between tradable and nontradable goods, which makes the nontradable sector particularly vulnerable. These frictions have been emphasized by Christiano et al. (2004) and Mendoza (2001) , but in other contexts than the choice of exchange rate regimes (namely, currency crises and sudden stops). Indeed, with low elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods, the output measured in foreign currency is more volatile under exible regimes. As a result, oating exchange rates are detrimental for growth as compared to xed exchange rates, especially in highly dollarized countries. In low-dollarization countries, this ranking can be reversed thanks to the hedging properties of domestically-denominated debt. We illustrate these eects in the model when the economy is hit by shocks on the tradable technology.
To test the basic hypothesis that exchange rate exibility has a more negative impact in dollarized countries, standard growth regressions are used. Those standard growth regressions are augmented by a measure of exchange rate exibility, a measure of external dollarization and the interaction term of exchange rate exibility and dollarization. The results are based on a dynamic panel of 76 emerging and industrial countries between 1995 and 2004 described above.
To measure exchange rate exibility, I use the Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) classication of exchange rate regimes. The dollarization measure is the external original sin taken from Hausmann et al. (2001) and Hausmann and Panizza (2003) . The empirical results show that exchange rate exibility is more detrimental to growth in dollarized countries than in non-dollarized countries, which is in line with the model's predictions. These ndings are robust to various specications and to the treatment of endogeneity.
Among the empirical works on liability dollarization at the macro level, only a few have examined the overall growth impact of original sin.
4 Bleaney and Vargas (2009) is closer to our approach. They investigate the role of the debt composition to explain the negative eect of depreciation on growth in emerging markets. Our approach diers in that it focuses on the interaction of debt composition with exchange rate volatility -and more generally, exchange rate management, and not exchange rate depreciations.
Section 2 presents a stylized model of growth and monetary policy. Section 3 derives the empirical implications of the model regarding the link between growth and exchange rate volatility. Section 4 tests these empirical predictions.
2 Early contributions include, among others, Calvo (2000) ; Krugman (2000) ; Aghion et al. (2000) . 3 Note that even in the Mundell-Fleming model, the type of shocks and capital controls can also reverse this oft-quoted result. See Ball (2010 
Firms and the growth process
Consider a small open economy with a continuum of rms, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1].
Firms produce both tradable goods T , which are identical to the outside world good, and nontradable ones N . There are two currencies: the domestic currency (peso) and the foreign one (dollar).
Firms are price-taker and competitive so that the law of one price applies in the sector of tradables:
where P T t and P T * t are respectively the domestic (peso) and foreign (dollar) price of tradable goods and S t is the nominal exchange rate. P T * t is assumed to be constant and normalized to one. Thus P T t = S t . The timing within period t can be summarized as follows. First, wages are preset. The entrepreneurs borrow to be able to innovate in period t + 1: that is upgrade A t , the level of productivity. An aggregate productivity shock occurs in the tradable sector, rms hire labor and produce tradable and nontradable goods. Firms repay their debt and pay the wages. Firms face idiosyncratic liquidity shocks in dollars. If the liquidity shocks are nanced, then rms are able to innovate. If they are not nanced, then rms cannot innovate and disappear at the end of the period. Finally, rms distribute prots.
First, the process governing the evolution of productivity is presented to determine how growth depends on current cash ows. We then determine cash ows.
2.1.1 The evolution of productivity Innovation process The innovation process is specied as follows: if the rm is able to overcome the liquidity shock of period t, then its t + 1 productivity is upgraded by a factor δ > 1. Otherwise, the rm keeps the same productivity level. As a result, aggregate productivity evolves according to:
with ρ t the proportion of innovating rms. The aggregate growth rate is therefore g t = (δ − 1)ρ t .
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Credit market imperfections and liquidity shocks To be able to innovate, the rm has to pay a xed cost D t = dA t (d > 0) at the beginning of period t. Firms start the period without funds, so they must borrow D t . It is assumed that the cost of borrowing is lower than the expected value of innovation, which implies that rms always choose to pay the xed cost. This cost can be viewed as spending on R&D, equipment goods or investment in a new technology. Since these goods are tradables, we assume that this cost is denominated in dollars.
At the end of period t, a liquidity shock A t Φ i t , where Φ i t is independently and identically distributed across rms, threatens the completion of the innovation process of rm i. If the rm does not nance this cost, it cannot innovate. If it meets this cost, it recovers A t Φ i t at the end of the current period. A t Φ i t can be viewed as a transitory shock that would ruin the business unless there is enough liquidity to overcome it. For simplicity, it is also assumed that the liquidity cost can be nanced with a zero interest rate. As a consequence, the innovation cost is neutral regarding the net prot of the current period. Therefore, it is always protable for the rms to nance the liquidity shock.
We assume that the liquidity shock is denominated in dollars. This assumption is important since the entrepreneurs' ability to hedge this shock will determine the innovation rate of the economy. It is justied by the fact that it is of the same nature as the initial xed cost, which is in dollars too. For example, if D t stands for the expenses on an equipment good, A t Φ i t can represent a missing part that has to be purchased again.
The access to nancial markets is therefore critical to determine the innovation capacity of the rm at this point, as Aghion et al. (2009) show. However, here, in order to stress the specic role of liability dollarization, we assume that the rm has no access at all to credit markets at this stage, so rms are able to overcome the transitory liquidity shock if and only if their cash ow is sucient to meet the cost:
where Π t is the cash ow of the rm expressed in dollars and scaled by A t .
Firms have the same cash ows Π t and dier only regarding the liquidity shock Φ i t . Therefore, ρ t , the proportion of rms which are not constrained (and thus of innovating rms), is the proportion of rms whose liquidity shock is lower than Π t :
where F is the cumulative distribution of Φ i t .
The aggregate growth rate depends directly on the level of cash ows Π t .
Volatility and growth Here, I give an example of how volatility aects average growth, that is E(ρ t ). Assume that the idiosyncratic liquidity shock φ i t is uniformly distributed over (φ, φ) , and that the disturbance on prots Π t resulting from the aggregate shock and exchange rate policy is of the following form:
with σ π strictly positive. σ π is a measure of aggregate volatility around the steady-state prots E(Π).
I assume that E(Π) − σ π > φ, which means that in the worst state of nature, there is always a positive fraction of rms that are able to overcome the liquidity shock. Under this reasonable assumption, the probability to innovate given the aggregate shock is then:
The growth rate ρ is concave in Π. An increase in the size of the aggregate shock σ π , which corresponds to a mean-preserving spread, would then decrease the proportion of innovating rms E(ρ) -and therefore the average growth rate.
The intuition is that when shocks are large, all rms innovate in the good state.
In that case, more volatility would crowd out more rms in the bad state while not allowing more rms to innovate in the good state. The idea is simply that when volatility increases, the gains generated in the good states are exhausted sooner or later, which does not allow to make for the additional losses in bad states. 
where L t denotes labor. Y
T i t
and Y
N i t
are the rm's productions scaled by the level of productivity and u t is the aggregate productivity shock in the tradable sector, with u t = σ, σ > 0 with probability 1/2 and u t = −σ with probability 1/2. For simplicity, it is assumed that the production of nontradables requires labor while the production of tradables involves no input. This specication has been chosen to capture the fact that the nontradable sector is more laborintensive than the tradable sector.
Firms choose employment to maximize the nontradable prot P N t √ L t −W t L t with respect to L t , where W t is the wage scaled by A t , and P N t is the peso price of nontradable goods. We get the implicit labor demand function:
The rm's gross prots are then equal to Y
Indebtment and dollarization It is assumed that debt D t = dA t is contracted in nominal terms and is denominated either in foreign currency (dollars) or in local currency (pesos). An exogenous fraction α is denominated in dollars while the rest is denominated in pesos. α is the degree of dollarization.
We assume that the level of dollarization is exogenous. Indeed, the fact that liability dollarization is imposed on developing countries is commonly admitted 6 in the literature.
56 . This nancial markets incompleteness is often related to the lack of sound institutions and can therefore be regarded as exogenous.
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r * , the interest rate on dollar bonds, is xed internationally. It is assumed that foreigners are risk neutral and value dollars so that r, the interest rate on peso bonds, satises the following no-arbitrage condition:
At the end of period t, the rm has therefore to repay in dollars:
Cash ows The liquidity shock occurs after the rm has paid the wage bill and repaid the debt, so the cash ow in terms of dollars and scaled by A t is the following:
The cash ows include gross prots, but to get the actual cash on hand, debt repayments must be subtracted from them. Comparing the gross prot component and the debt component of cash ows gives the actual nancing capacity of rms.
Because rms' revenues are partly in nontradable goods while the liquidity shock is denominated in tradables, rms face a currency mismatch. According to (6), rms' gross prots are sensitive to nominal exchange rate variations (changes in P T t ). However, the peso-denominated fraction of rms' debt helps them hedge the variations in the nontradable value of their prots. For example, everything else equal, a nominal depreciation implies a fall in the value of gross 5 See for example Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999) . 6 Yet, some authors nd that exchange rate regimes do aect rms' balance sheets. In particular, the adoption of a oating exchange rate regime leads to a higher degree of currency matching (and the opposite for the adoption of xed regimes), as Galiani et al. (2003) show for the case of Argentina's currency board and Kamil (2008) does for a panel of emerging countries. However, these studies are conducted on developing countries only. On our macro data set, for a given exchange rate regime, developing countries still exhibit higher liability dollarization than industrial ones, which is a symptom of imposed original sin. 7 Existing explanations point at time inconsistency problems related to the temptation to "default" on local currency debt through ination (Calvo and Guidotti, 1989) , the incidence of implicit debtor guarantees (Burnside et al., 2001 ) and signaling problems (De la Torre et al., 2003) , among others. De Nicolo et al. (2003) provides evidence that the credibility of macroeconomic policy and the quality of institutions are both key determinants of crosscountry variations in dollarization.
7 prots in terms of tradables. If α < 1, a nominal depreciation leads to a decrease in debt repayments in terms of tradables, which alleviates the overall impact of the depreciation on the total cash ows, whereas if α = 1, this hedging property of debt is absent.
However, whether this intuition is robust to general equilibrium is not guaranteed. The following subsection closes the model in order to derive its properties in general equilibrium.
Closing the model and introducing exchange rate policy
The purpose of this subsection is to examine the impact of exchange rate policy in terms of transmission of shocks to prices and quantities, and therefore to rms' cash ows.
The presence of nominal rigidities (preset wages) implies that monetary policy has real consequences, in particular in terms of cash ow volatility. Some other key assumptions contribute to shape the model's predictions. First, the nontradable sector is more labor-intensive than the tradable one. This is empirically relevant, but it has also an important implication, which is that an output contraction is consistent with a real depreciation. As a result, the pesodenominated debt has hedging properties regarding cash-ows volatility in terms of dollars. Second, the elasticity of substitution between tradables and nontradables is lower than one, which is widely admitted in the literature, but is also key in ranking the exible and xed exchange rate regimes in terms of cash-ow volatility.
The model is closed in a simplistic way in order to keep the model as tractable as possible. The following assumptions are made, without loss of generality: (i) the demand addressed to rms is given by consumers without access to nancial markets (hand-to-mouth consumers); (ii) the government controls directly the general price level. Finally, (iii) we assume, as in Aghion et al. (2009) , that the real wage at the beginning of period t is assumed equal to some reservation value, kA t t:
Households Denote by C T t and C N t the consumptions of tradables and nontradables by households, scaled by A t . Since nontradables cannot be traded internationally, the nontradable output is entirely consumed in equilibrium:
Besides, since households do not have access to nancial markets, the tradable consumption is what remains from the tradable production after repaying the debt:
This means that both current accounts, in tradables and nontradables, are balanced.
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The relative demand for tradables and nontradables by households is standard. It follows:
This results from the maximization by households of a CES consumption basket,
given their resources. θ is the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods. It is assumed that θ < 1, which means that goods are weakly substitutable. This is a standard assumption regarding tradables and nontradables. 0 < γ < 1 is the weight of tradables in the consumption basket.
The associated general price index is the following:
Monetary policy Monetary policy targets either the stability of the general price index -exible exchange rate:
or the stability of the nominal exchange rate -xed exchange rate:
This model is solved with either one of the two monetary policies (12) or (13).
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Model's empirical implications
In this section, I study the dierential impact of aggregate shocks on the quantities and prices under both regimes by using the log-linearized version of the model and then derive some conclusions on exchange rate regimes and growth. 9 8 The current account in the tradable sector is balanced because we have assumed that there is no intertemporal trading, that is no asset trade. This assumption simplies the analysis but is not crucial. Qualitatively, the results would be unchanged if we introduced intertemporal trade in bonds. This is because, as long as there is imperfect risk sharing, a productivity shock leads households to alter their consumption, which is at the origin of the mechanisms of the model. Trade in bonds only limits the impact of productivity shocks on consumption by sharing their eect between current and future consumption; it does not suppress it. In what follows, x t denotes the deviation from the non-stochastic steady state of X t : x t = Xt−X X ln(X t ) − ln(X). Time subscript are dropped for simplicity.
Reactions of quantities and prices to shocks
After log-linearizing the model, the following proposition can be derived:
Proposition 1 After an identical negative (positive) productivity shock in the tradable sector:
(i) If α = 1, the production of nontradables (y N ) falls (rises) more under a peg than under a oat. However, the relative price of nontradables (p N − p T ) (henceforth the real exchange rate) experiences a higher depreciation (appreciation) under a oat.
(ii) If α = 1, the fall (rise) in the nontradable production valued in terms of tradables (y
is larger under a oat than under a peg.
(iii) Under a oat, this fall (rise) is mitigated when α diminishes.
(i) is a standard result. A negative shock on the productivity of the tradable sector requires a real depreciation (a fall in p N − p T ) which results in a contractionary deation in the nontradable sector under both regimes, as illustrated in Figure 1 . Indeed, in both regimes, a deation in p N generates a contraction in y N because the nontradable sector uses labor and the wages are predetermined. This negative eect on y N is accentuated under the xed exchange rate regime because the real depreciation occurs entirely through a deation in p N while under a exible regime it is shared between a rise in p T and a fall in p N . However, precisely because of the further contraction in y N , the real exchange rate depreciation is milder under a peg because it compensates for the fall in y T .
As a result, the comparative impact of a negative or positive shock on the nontradable production valued in terms of tradables is ambiguous. But, when θ < 1, the price eects dominate. Take the case of a negative shock on the tradable production. When α = 1, the additional fall in the relative price of nontradables under a oat osets the additional fall in nontradable output under a peg. The production of nontradables expressed in tradables therefore falls more under a oat than under a peg. Noticeably, the traditional contractionary deation is present under the xed exchange rate regime. Despite that, the output in terms of tradables is more aected if the exchange rate freely oats.
The existence of frictions in the reallocation between tradable and nontradable goods inside the consumption basket is crucial to generate this result.
When α = 1, all the debt is denominated in dollar, so it plays no role in stabilizing the dollar value of cash ows, whatever the exchange rate regime, hence (ii). But when α falls, the consumption of tradables is stabilized under a oat thanks to the hedging eect of the peso-denominated debt, which mitigates Assumptions: θ = 0.6, γ = 0.4, κ = 0.6, η = 0.7. η denotes the steady-state ratio of debt repayments over the tradable consumption (tradable prot minus debt repayments) and κ is the steady-state share of nontradables in cash ows. 
The impact of exchange rate regimes on growth
If we admit, following the arguments of section 2.1.1, that lower cash-ow volatility yields higher growth through a higher innovating probability, it is possible to infer what regime is preferred in terms of growth.
Proposition 2 (i) If α = 1, a peg yields higher growth than a oat.
(ii) When α decreases, the growth dierential between a peg and a oat decreases.
(iii) If the indebtment level and the elasticity of substitution are high and if the share of nontradable production is low, there exist values of α > 0 such 11 that a oat yields higher growth than a peg. repayments over the tradable consumption is equal to 0.1 (low level of debt) and the solid lines are drawn under the assumption that it is equal to 0.7 (high level of debt). Besides, the elasticity of substitution θ has been set at 0.6, which is a standard estimate of the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontradable goods (Lorenzo et al., 2005) , and the weight of nontradable goods in the consumption basket 1−γ as well as in cash ows κ are set to 0.6 (Mendoza, 2001) .
10 It appears clearly that the volatility of cash ows under a oat increases with the level of dollarization under both parameters' conguration. Under the rst hypothesis (low debt), the volatility of cash ows with the exible exchange rate regime is always higher than with the xed regime, whereas under the second hypothesis (high debt), the volatility becomes lower with the exible exchange rate regime for small values of α.
As a conclusion, the testable empirical implication of this model is that the xed exchange rate regime is growth-enhancing as compared to the exible exchange rate regime in countries with high liability dollarization and that the growth dierential is decreasing as the level of dollarization falls. Whether there are values of dollarization for which a oat becomes more growth-enhancing than a peg depends on parameters values and has to be determined empirically.
Empirical Analysis
In this section, the prediction that the level of dollarization conditions the impact of exchange rate regimes on growth is tested. The basic hypothesis is that exchange rate exibility has a more negative impact in dollarized countries.
To do so, standard growth regressions are used. These regressions are augmented by a measure of exchange rate exibility, a measure of external dollarization and the interaction term of exchange rate exibility and dollarization. 
Data and methodology
As is common in the growth empirical literature, we work on non-overlapping ve-year averages. This transformation aims at ltering business-cycle uctuations and so allows us to focus on long-run eects only.
The dependent variable
The explained variable is the average growth rate of productivity on a ve-year period. Productivity is dened as the ratio of real output per worker. Real GDP is in 1995 PPP-adjusted US dollars. The work force and GDP data come respectively from the World Bank (World Development Indicators database) and CEPII (CHELEM database).
Exchange rate exibility variable
The measure of exchange rate exibility is an index of exchange rate exibility 
The dollarization variable
The most important and most problematic variable is the liability dollarization measure. It is dicult to nd a measure which is both accurate and encompass- 
Other control variables
The set of control variables follows Levine et al. (2000) and Aghion et al. (2009): nancial development measured as in Beck et al. (1999) by the amount of credit provided by banks and other nancial institutions to the private sector (as a share of GDP), education measured as the average years of secondary schooling (Barro and Lee, 2000) , ination and the size of government measured by governement consumption as a percentage of GDP and trade openness measured by the share of exports and imports in GDP (World Bank). 
Methodology
The benchmark specication follows Barro and Sala-i Martin (1995) , and more γ 1 + γ 3 OSIN i t describes the overall eect of exchange rate exibility on growth. γ 1 (the linear term) and γ 1 + γ 3 (which is provided as complementary information) can be interpreted respectively as the eect of exchange rate exibility in low dollarization countries (original sin=0) and in high dollarization countries (original sin=1). The threshold original sin for which the sign of the overall impact of exchange rate exibility changes is −γ1 γ3
. The estimate for −γ1 γ3
is provided along with its signicance test as complementary information in the regressions. Besides, a Wald test for the signicance of exchange rate total eect is run.
The main hypothesis to test is whether exchange rate exibility has a more negative eect on growth when the level of dollarization increases. This would be validated by the data if γ 3 is found signicantly negative. Otherwise, the model would be rejected. The second hypothesis is that the threshold original
is between 0 and 1. This would mean that the impact of exchange rate risk on growth switches from positive to negative within the actual range of the original sin measure. The validation of this hypothesis would shed some light on the exchange rate instability puzzle, which could then be explained by the presence of this kind of non-linearities.
Since the model is dynamic, country eects are necessarily correlated with y i t−1 . The GMM dynamic panel data estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) is implemented. The persistence of the dollarization data justies the use of the extended system-GMM estimator elaborated by Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell and Bond (2000) . Robust two-step standard errors are also computed by following the method of Windmeijer (2004) . Using this approach, the issue of the endogeneity of the lagged explained variable is addressed. The set of instruments is selected according to the following assumption: all the explanatory variables except initial income are predetermined and they are uncorrelated with xed eects.
11 This assumption has been chosen after excluding more restrictive ones which suered from weak instruments issues according to the Anderson and Cragg-Donald tests of underidentication.
12 These tests assess whether the instruments give sucient 11 In practice, (14) is dierentiated and the second lag of the endogenous variable y i t−2 is used as an instrument for ∆y i t−1 , as well as further lags. Though our sample has only two available observations because of the scarcity of dollarization data, we can rely on lags of y i t beyond the limits of our data. To limit the number of instruments, I use only y i t−2 and y i t−3 to instrument ∆y i t−1 . Since we assume that the other regressors are predetermined, we use their rst and second lags as instruments. The system-GMM method consists in adding equations (14) in level as additional observations to limit the problem of weak instruments in presence of persistence. y i t−1 is then instrumented with ∆y i t−1 and the other regressors in levels. 12 This assumption has also been chosen for practical reasons. Because of data scarcity, it is impossible to use second order lags of original sin. It can be therefore considered at best as predetermined (the other variables, in particular the lagged explained variable, can still be instrumented thanks to the available higher lags). Table 1 shows the results of the GMM regression of productivity growth on the set of explanatory variables described earlier, using equation (14).
The role of nancial dollarization
Consider the impact of exchange rate exibility and original sin on growth.
Regression (1) of Table 1 shows that in our sample, the overall impact of exchange rate exibility on growth is negative. But, importantly, as column (2) shows, liability dollarization makes the impact of real exchange rate volatility on growth more negative, as conjectured. This is illustrated by the fact that the coecient of the interaction term of original sin and exchange rate exibility is signicantly negative (at the 5% level). As conjectured, the threshold level of liability dollarization above which exchange rate exibility becomes detrimental to growth is between 0 and 1 (0.56).
As a consequence, on the one hand, the impact of exchange rate exibility is signicantly negative in both specications when original sin is equal to 1. On the other hand, exchange rate exibility has a positive impact on growth in low dollarization countries (the coecient of the linear term is positive), and this impact is signicant. Besides, the total eect of exchange rate exibility is signicant.
Notice that the linear eect of original sin is signicantly positive in Column (2), which is at odds with the ndings of Eichengreen et al. (2005) (Reinhart et al., 2003 ).
An alternative policy to dedollarization, and perhaps more eective, is to decrease the level of exchange rate exibility. Consider for example Slovenia which, in the process of integration into the Eurozone, stabilized progressively its exchange rate. Its index of exchange rate exibility moved from 1.8 to 1 while its dollarization index stayed constant at 1. This corresponds to a 0.6 percentage point increase in growth rate. In general, moving from one level of exibility to a lower one in the LS scale (e.g. from a crawling peg to a peg -from 2 to 1 in the LS scale, or from a oat to a dirty oat -from 4 to 3) increases growth by 0.7 percentage points in countries that are fully dollarized.
The regressions reported in columns (3) and (4) examine the channels of the impact of exchange rate exibility on growth. Column (3) introduces REER volatility and its interaction with original sin. The interaction of original sin with REER volatility is signicantly negative while its interaction with the LS index of exchange rate exibility becomes non-signicant. This means that, as implied by the model, real exchange rate volatility is the main channel through which exchange rate management aects growth.
Column (4) estimates the impact of REER volatility along with terms-oftrade volatility and their respective interactions with original sin. Neither termsof-trade volatility nor its interaction with original sin aect growth, whereas the coecient of the interaction of REER volatility with original sin remains signicantly negative. This suggests that the main channel through which REER volatility aects growth is the volatility of the relative price of nontradables.
Our results are consistent with Aghion et al. (2009) , who show that nancial development makes exchange rate volatility less harmful to growth. Indeed, dollarization is intimately related to nancial development since the lack of ability to borrow in the domestic currency is a kind of market incompleteness.
Financial dollarization is actually one of the channels through which nancial underdevelopment aects growth. Our results therefore reinforce the ndings of Aghion et al.
However, the observation that dollarization and nancial development are negatively correlated (see Appendix B) makes us wonder whether the interaction eects we nd merely reect the eect of nancial development already highlighted in Aghion et al. or whether they identify an independent eect of nancial dollarization. In column (5), we test whether original sin is an independent determinant of the relationship between exchange rate volatility and growth. This regression includes the interaction between nancial development and exchange rate exibility. The interaction between exchange rate exibility and original sin remains signicant, which suggests that original sin conditions the impact of exchange rate exibility on growth independently from nancial development. The interaction between nancial development and exchange rate exibility is non-signicant. However, given the strong correlation between original sin and nancial development, this does not necessarily indicate that nancial development is irrelevant in shaping the relationship between exchange rate regimes and growth.
Robustness checks
Columns (1)- (5) of Table 2 Table 2 shows, the inclusion of additional controls does not change the results: the interaction term between original sin and exchange rate exibility is still signicantly negative at the 5% level. Among the new variables, ination and education show up as signicant. The lack of price stability has a negative inuence on growth while education has a positive impact, which in line with the traditional ndings of the literature and with common wisdom.
Currency crisis
Column (2) presents further robustness checks. The question tackled here is the role of currency crises. Since episodes of crisis-driven devaluations occur mainly during xed exchange rate regimes and could be mistakenly classied as exible exchange rate regimes, this question is important to assess the dierent advantages of xed exchange rate regimes versus oats.
A dummy for the occurrence of currency crisis episodes and its interaction with original sin are introduced in the regression to check whether the negative growth eect of the interaction between original sin and exchange rate volatility is limited to episodes of nancial turmoil. We identify currency crisis through the freely falling episodes provided by Reinhart and Rogo (2004) . The results show that, in spite of the inclusion of a dummy for freely falling episodes and its interaction with original sin, the interaction of exchange rate exibility and original sin is still signicant. This shows that the particularly negative impact of exible exchange rate regimes in dollarized countries highlighted before is not driven by nancial turmoil episodes.
Dollarized indebtment
The original sin measure used in the baseline regressions is a composite index summarizing the inability of a country to hedge currency risk. But it does not take into account the extent to which it is exposed to this currency risk, that is debt liabilities. The amount of indebtment should qualify the importance of original sin. We therefore construct another variable incorporating both original sin and debt liabilities, and dened as: OSIN 2 = OSIN * DEBT L, where DEBT L refers to external debt liabilities over GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006) . Column (3) provides the regression with this alternative original sin measure. The results are reinforced: the coecient is now signicant at the 1% level.
Developing versus Industrial countries
Columns (4) to (6) try to determine whether our results are due to the fact that original sin is very high in developing countries and low in industrial economies in general. The results could reect only the fact that exchange rate exibility is bad for growth in emerging economies as other authors have already shown, without proving necessarily the role of dollarization. This objection is justied by the observation that original sin is very correlated with the fact of being a developing or industrial country (see Figure 3 and the correlation between initial productivity and original sin in Appendix B).
A dummy for industrial countries and its interaction with exchange rate exibility are thus added in columns (4) and (5), with our alternative measures of original sin. Consider column (4), which uses OSIN as a measure of dollarization. The results are robust: the coecient is stable and remains signicant at the 5% level. However, original sin being very stable in the sample of developing countries, the eect of the interaction term is identied mainly through the variation between industrial countries. To overcome this problem, the second measure of original sin (OSI N 2), incorporating debt liabilities and which thus provides more variability among developing countries, is used in column (5).
The interaction term remains stable and signicant.
Finally, column (6) excludes industrial countries from the sample. The sample size being signicantly reduced, the less signicant control variables (namely trade openness and government burden) are excluded. Since OSIN shows little variability in developing countries, OSIN 2 is used as a measure of dollarization in this regression. Here again, the interaction term is robustly negative.
Endogeneity issues
One important reproach that can be addressed to our results is the question of endogeneity. Two dierent strategies are adopted to deal with this problem: 1) exogeneity tests are conducted within the GMM methodology, 2) the endogeneity issue is dealt with by examining the existing empirical evidence on the determinants of original sin and exchange rate exibility. This last discussion enables us to (i) address the simultaneity issue by introducing additional variables that could be correlated with both growth and dollarization; and (ii) to propose an external instrumental variable for original sin.
First, note that the system-GMM methodology deals with the endogeneity of the lagged explanatory variable. Still, the procedure is valid only under our assumption that the other regressors are predetermined, which means that the regressors are uncorrelated with the current and future realizations of the error term, and uncorrelated with xed eects. This condition can be tested by a Sargan test of overidentication which assesses the overall validity of the instruments. All the Sargan tests of the tables accept the validity of the set of instruments. Besides, as highlighted by Aghion et al. (2009) , the interaction term is less vulnerable to potential endogeneity issues than the corresponding linear terms, because it identies contrasting growth eects. Indeed, the use of interactions is similar to the dierence-in-dierence method. Even though the linear eect of original sin of exchange rate exibility might be biased, the eect of exchange rate exibility, given the level of original sin, can still be accurate. Other studies analysed the determinants of other variables that could be partly related to original sin. Mehl and Reynaud (2005) show that ination -which is already included in the present growth regressions -debt service to GDP, the slope of the yield curve and the investor base inuence domestic original sin. Levy-Yeyati (2006) nds that institutional variables and ination, but also pass-through and the procyclicality of the real exchange rate, have an impact 20 on domestic dollarization. To study the impact of dollarization on growth, he uses restrictions on onshore foreign currency deposits (De Nicolo et al., 2003) as an instrument. The degree of pass-through and the correlation of the real exchange rate with growth are not suciently correlated with our index to be used as instruments in our study. However, restrictions on foreign currency deposits appears as a good instrument for external original sin, so we use them as an external instrument inside the GMM methodology. Concerning debt and institutions, since they could also have an impact on growth, I include them in the regressions to check for robustness.
As for exchange rate exibility, some determinants have been highlighted in the literature. Hau (2002) show that trade openness is an important factor in explaining real exchange rate volatility. This variable is already included in our regressions in the robustness checks. Hausmann et al. (2006) nd that growth has a signicantly positive eect on real exchange rate volatility. This should bias the eect of exchange rate volatility upwards. Therefore, if the coecient is negative despite this positive bias, our interpretations remain correct.
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Consider Table 3 . Column (1) deals with the simultaneity issue by introducing the average of Kaufmann et al. (1999) Governance indicators, which should account for institutional quality and net external debt as a share of GDP (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti, 2006) . The ination rate is also maintained, since it has also been pointed to as a cause for liability dollarization. The interaction between original sin and exchange rate exibility is still negative and the main results 14 As a conclusion, the nonlinear eect of exchange rate exibility and original sin on growth is globally robust to the inclusion of additional controls and to the use of an alternative measure of original sin: exchange rate exibility has a more negative impact on productivity growth in dollarized than in non-dollarized countries. Besides, this additional negative eect is not due to exchange rate crisis episodes. Additionally, the high concentration of original sin in developing country is not driving our results. Finally, the results are robust to endogeneity treatments. Therefore, further controls do not change the results qualitatively. However, they do aect quantitatively the interaction term of exchange rate exibility. In particular, the eects are typically lower than in the baseline regression in column (2) of Table 1 . But since the linear eect of exchange rate exibility is also typically lower, the level of original sin at which the eect of exible rates change signs remains signicantly between 0 and 1, at levels between 0.40 and 0.60, depending on the specication. 13 For further discussion of the endogeneity issues associated with exchange rate exibility, see Aghion et al. (2009). 14 Interestingly, when adding additional variables and controlling for endogeneity, the linear term becomes unsignicant, which does not contradict previous evidence in the literature. share of foreign currency in external debt, the more exchange rate volatility is detrimental to growth, which is in line with the empirical results of section 4: the interaction of exchange rate exibility with original sin has a negative impact. It appears also that, in absolute terms, exchange rate exibility is growth-reducing in highly dollarized countries and growth-enhancing in low dollarization countries. Consistently, the threshold original sin above which exchange rate risk becomes detrimental to growth is estimated to be signicantly between zero and one. This sheds some light on the instability of the eect of exchange rate volatility on growth in previous literature. We also show that these predictions survive robustness checks and endogeneity treatment.
The study of the impact of exchange rate exibility on growth can help address the issue of the choice of monetary framework in a setting of nancial openness and growing cross-country capital ows. The available choices are delimited by the trilemma (Obstfeld et al., 2005) : under perfect capital mobility, policymakers cannot attain simultaneously exchange rate stability and domestically-oriented monetary policy. Typically, as in this paper's theoretical framework, adopting an exchange rate peg entails the sacrice of the shock absorption capacity of exible exchange rates. Forex market interventions can maintain an exchange rate xed while pursuing domestic policy objectives, but international reserves are sooner or later depleted, making it impossible to achieve both objectives in the long run. It might seem then optimal for emerging countries that embrace nancial globalization to let the exchange rate oat in order to follow domestic objectives, but liability dollarization makes it more dicult for them to adopt oating exchange rates. This explains why they exhibit fear of oating (Hausmann et al., 2001; Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) . This study sheds some additional light on the reasons why developing economies nd it hard to draw a comfortable resolution of the trilemma.
Finally, a caveat of our approach is that we treated exchange rate regimes as a continuum, from rigid to exible. As has been emphasized in the literature, some other dimensions of exchange rate regimes may matter, for example, the distinction between hard and soft xes (Bubula and Otker-Robe, 2003) , and the presence of a monetary anchor for (Bailliu et al., 2003) . In particular, the specicity of intermediary regimes dollarization suggests an interesting direction for research. Because these regimes are more prone to currency crises than both oats and hard pegs, liability dollarization should be particularly harmful for them. This could explain the vanishing middle hypothesis (Fischer, 2001 ).
But this is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research. Robust t statistics in parentheses * signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1% 
